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Reviewed by Laurie L. Levenson
Who do you fear more? In constructing a framework to understand the
history of judicial independence in America, The People’s Courts provides an
indispensable service in probing what lies at the core of judicial independence.
It is not a simple matter of resisting attacks on individual judges. Judicial
independence is one of the most complex and nuanced issues in the law.
Volumes have been written about it,1 but few have been able to present the
detailed historical context set forth in Professor Jed Shugerman’s new book.
Judicial elections were originally an effort to avoid undue legislative or
executive influence over appointees and to create greater judicial accountability
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directly to the public. However, as politics changed, judicial elections made
judges less independent. While those in favor of judicial independence sought
refuge in the “rule of law,” the pendulum swung back toward appointment
systems that would give judges more freedom from direct political forces.
Thus, the history of judicial independence in America has really been a story
of how politics frame our discussion of how much power and how much
accountability judges should have.
Jed Shugerman has done an expert job of chronicling the history of
judicial selection in America. Unless one understands how the politics and
economics of an era influence judicial independence, one cannot speak
meaningfully about judicial independence. This book will challenge students
to understand that the concept exists within an essential paradox—namely, that
judicial independence requires judges to be both free from other democratic
institutions, but also accountable to them.
What is Judicial Independence?
Shugerman starts with the basic question: What is judicial independence?
He answers that “[j]udicial independence has different meanings, but at its core,
it refers to a judge’s insulation from the political and personal consequences
of his or her legal decisions” (7). In other words, judicial independence is the
freedom of judges to decide cases based upon what is right for the parties in
that case and not what might serve to benefit the interests of others, including
the judge.
Yet, in practice judicial independence is an elusive concept. Complete
judicial independence is neither desirable nor possible for a judge. “General
independence does not mean absolute autonomy; a judge might still be
influenced informally by public opinion, elite opinion, reputation, and
ambitions for promotion” (7). The pertinent question is really which
institutions should have more or less influence over the judge. The reality is that
as “judges become more independent from one set of powers [they become]
more accountable to another” (7). Rather than speaking of absolute judicial
independence, Shugerman uses history to explain the concepts of relative and
general judicial independence. Relative judicial independence asks from whom
the judge is independent. General judicial independence, by contrast, asks how
much independence from political pressure the judge possesses. Reforms such
as job security and protection of jurisdiction and salary foster general judicial
independence. Reforms such as judicial selection foster relative judicial
independence (7).
Shugerman uses the lens of American history to show how political interests
and economics have shaped the concepts of judicial independence. In an era
of corrupt appointments, reformers will push toward judicial elections. In an
era in which judges seem to be at the arbitrary majoritarian will of the voters,
reformers will support appointment processes. Today, when some fear that the
electoral system will be corrupted by corporate influences, it is likely that those
in favor of judicial independence will look again toward merit appointments.
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Shugerman makes a compelling argument that the very “notion of what
‘politics’ judges [are] supposed to be independent from change[s] over time, in
part because the notions of what kinds of politics [are] necessary [as opposed
to corrupting] also change[s] over time”(6, italics in original). Thus, to
truly understand judicial independence, one must understand the history of
judicial selection in America. Ranging from Thomas Jefferson and Alexis de
Tocqueville to Rose Bird and the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United,2
this book makes the reader a witness to history as the pendulum of judicial
independence swings from one reform to another. Ironically, judges are rarely
the motivating force for these changes. Rather, most of the influences are
external and framed by those whose livelihoods and values are affected most
by the courts.
Before reviewing briefly Shugerman’s history of judicial independence
reforms, it might be best to recall why we care. Although Shugerman does
not dwell on this question, establishing trust in the judiciary underlies the
discussion throughout the book. We care about judicial independence
because the people’s trust in the judiciary and its effectiveness depends heavily
on whether judges are seen as pawns of corrupting influences or as paragons
of integrity. The ability to attract qualified individuals to serve as judges is
easily influenced by the reputation of the judiciary. Further, judges’ ability
to influence the law depends on whether they have the political stature that
will result in the enforcement of their rulings. Most importantly, judicial
independence plays a fundamental role in separation of powers. The history of
judicial independence in America is really a story about the role of separation
of powers in our democratic system.
Shugerman’s book is a wonderful history of judicial independence, but its
relevance goes far beyond that. Today, we face fundamental questions about
the role of judges, how judges should be selected and how long they should
serve. We are moving toward another crossroads as we decide between “a
flawed-but-promising judicial meritocracy and a flawed-and-worsening judicial
plutocracy” (12). Americans will need to make some important decisions
regarding judicial reform. Understanding the history of judicial independence
in America may, as Shugerman states, “help us find a plausible path back to
judicial independence” (12).
In a chronological review of judicial independence in America, Shugerman
teaches the fundamental lessons that must be understood in order to
tackle current challenges to independence. With interesting anecdotes and
scholarly detail, Shugerman takes the reader through the history of judicial
appointments, elections, and judicial politics in America.
Lessons of the Colonial Era: “What is a Judge?”
From the beginning, Shugerman compels the reader to rethink the very
notion of how judges might operate. Today, we think of judges as persons of
2.
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authority who decide individual cases. However, that has not always been the
case. In colonial times, judges were part of the aristocracy of power. Borrowing
from the British system, elected members of legislative assemblies doubled as
judges and local elected officials who wore the different hats of each branch
of government. Thus, “[c]olonial assemblies not only exercised control over
judges; they also served as judges, similar to the English House of Lords” (15).
As Americans pursued independence from England, the Founding Fathers,
including Benjamin Franklin, advocated a system of judicial independence
based upon the concept of “during good behavior.” Judges could serve as long
as they “behaved well” and generally performed their duties. The goal was to
insulate judges from removal based upon the mere whim of the other branches
of the government. Thus, while legislators still had the power to choose judges,
job security would give judges a certain amount of independence in making
their decisions.
The Federal Constitutional Convention embraced this approach in
drafting Article III of the federal Constitution,3 but the provision met with
considerable resistance amid growing concerns that life-tenure judges would
be too powerful and aristocratic. Thus, crafting a mechanism to remove judges
who demonstrated too much of a tendency toward judicial supremacy became
critical. For early Americans, judicial independence meant independence from
England or legislators who sought to control the courts.
The idea of judicial elections grew from a desire to make judges more
accountable to popular control and to establish a democracy based upon
separation of power. However, opposition to judicial power was not the only
impetus leading to judicial elections. “Instead, [judicial elections] were a
shield to defend localities against the elite outsiders in more remote capitals,
and they were a means of separating powers to increase the courts as a check
against legislative power” (58). Election of judges was a colonial frontier
practice. Thus, for example, Vermonters in 1777 rebelled against New York’s
remote legal regime by electing their own judges.
There was another governing force leading to states’ early experiment with
judicial elections. In Georgia, for example, judicial elections were a reaction
against corruption in the state legislature. Given that the legislature had been
appointing the judges, the best check on the legislative powers was to shift
power from the legislature to the people. Judicial independence was not
thought of as absolute lattitude for judges to do as they please. Rather, it
was a political vehicle to make judges more accountable to the people than
legislators in making their decisions.
Finally, judicial elections were adopted because they served political and
personal agendas. For example, in the Indiana territory in 1816, electing
3.
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judges provided a vehicle for ousting Virginia Aristocrats who favored slavery
and replacing them with frontiersmen who were strongly antislavery. Judicial
independence was focused less on protecting the will of the individual
judge than on the political forces the judge’s election or appointment would
serve. Shugerman gives a state-by-state analysis of early judicial elections
that poignantly proves his point. “In Mississippi—as well as in Vermont,
Georgia, and Indiana—interest groups framed judicial elections in terms of
judicial independence” (83). Judges decided cases, but their independence
was determined by whether they were a political asset to key stakeholders in
democracy.
Lessons of the 1840s: “Crisis and House Cleaning”
Historically, the issue of judicial independence arose when failed economic
policies led to fiscal crises. Not surprisingly, judges (like their legislative and
executive counterparts) who have upheld controversial economic programs
have found their way to the chopping block. Judicial elections provide the
opportunity not just to remove an unpopular judge, but also to clean house.
Shugerman offers a wonderful example from New York’s 1846 Convention
which he describes as “the Barnburners’ ‘bench-clearing brawl’” (92). The
economic crises of the early 1840s and the Panics of 1837 and 1839 led to New
York’s Constitutional Convention of 1846. The crises began in the banking
industry and quickly spread throughout the economy. Legislatures went on
a spending binge, the bottom fell out of state budgets, and judges found
themselves a target of anxious and vengeful politicians. In New York, the
“Hunkers” (insiders who had “hunkered” for spoils from the appointment
or patronage system) were opposed by the “Barnburners” (those who
threatened to “destroy the canals, corporations and banks in order to curb
the debts, corruption, and abuses associated with them”) (88). Because the
Hunkers had a monopoly on Supreme Court justices, part of their opponents’
political strategy was to institute judicial elections in the name of “judicial
independence.”
New York’s example served as a model for other states that convened
constitutional conventions and reassessed their manner of selecting judges.
Judicial elections were a political tool to make judges independent from
disfavored parties that had dominated state politics. Importantly, “New
York’s adoption [of a new model for selecting judges] was pivotal in lending
credibility to judicial elections and demonstrating that voters could be trusted
to choose established, experienced, and qualified judges” (101).
The move toward judicial elections continued throughout the 1840s and
1850s as part of an anti-legislature agenda. However, there were additional
considerations including the growing belief that judicial elections would
“foster a more confident, pure, professional judiciary that would actually rise
above politics and would be faithful to legal principle and ‘science’ instead”
(105). Thus, contrary to the current belief that judicial elections would restrain
a judge’s independence, the movement toward judicial elections in the mid-
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1800s was designed to give judges more independence. Reformers believed
that “direct democracy would be better at insulating the courts” (111-112) and
that judicial elections, even if run through political parties, would better
serve the public. As Shugerman notes, “faith in party-run judicial elections
reflect[ed] a long-term shift from the view that mass party politics threatened
democracy to the view that mass party politics protected democracy” (114).
Lessons of the Newly-Elected Judges:
Counter-majoritarianism and Judicial Review
Indeed, the newly elected judges were more aggressive on behalf of the
rights of “the people.” However, not in the manner expected. Judges flexed
their power of judicial review to strike down popular legislation when they
viewed the will of the majority as trampling on individual rights, including
vested property rights. “[S]tate judges around the country generally used their
new power not as much for the most important purpose of ‘the American
revolutions of 1848’ (fiscal restraint on legislative spending). The most
frequent use of judicial review was for their own institutional self-interest: the
protection and expansion of judicial power against legislative encroachment”
(133).
Elected judges had an uncomfortable relationship with democracy. They
were expected to be both accountable to the public, but also to differentiate
themselves from the other branches that could be corrupted by political
powers. Judges turned to the “rule of law” to create an elite status. Through
the power of judicial review, judges could thrive in America because they were
simultaneously “the guardians of democracy and the guardians against too
much democracy” (143).
Yet, judges never completely escaped politics in the broadest sense of that
term. Throughout history, business interests, opportunities for advancement,
and local constituencies have always had an influence on how judges do their
job. Shugerman demonstrates, however, that judges’ commitment to “the rule
of law” was important in establishing that they would not be as vulnerable to
corruption as other political branches would be.
Lessons of Partisan Judicial Elections:
Appearances of Impartiality and Pushing the Pendulum Back
Today, it would be very odd to think of a partisan judicial election system
as one that would promote judicial independence. After all, to the extent that
judges need the support of their political parties to succeed, they would be far
from independent from the parties’ interests. However, part of the genius of
Shugerman’s historical review is in realizing that assumptions about judicial
independence depend on the political era in which they occur.
For example, popular elections in the mid-19th century generally involved a
partisan nomination process. “Reformers believed that the emerging political
parties were necessary for the people to organize and mobilize against the
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‘monster banks,’ corporations, and the ‘interests’” (148). Parties were seen as
a vehicle toward achieving judicial independence. Rather than fearing one
particular institution as a threat to judicial independence, the lesson of history
is to evaluate each special interest through the lens of its times. As we have
learned, special interests may come with different names—legislatures, political
parties, or even “judicial independence” commissions.
Once parties became too influential, it was time to devise other nonpartisan
plans to preserve the independence of the judiciary. In 1906, the pendulum
began to swing back. American Judicature Society members proposed not
just eliminating partisan elections but also reviving an appointment process.
Throughout the early 20th century, there were general efforts to institute a “merit
system” for civil service employees. However, it took the Great Depression to
move toward an elite and professionalized “nonpartisan court plan.”
Sometimes, it takes a good crime wave, preceded by a cataclysmic depression,
to bring on political and judicial reforms. Shugerman does a wonderful job
of describing how Earl Warren rode the tide of both. The push for a return
to an appointment system for judges was preceded by the “Public Enemies”
crime era of Bonnie and Clyde, Al Capone, John Dillinger and Baby Face
Nelson. One solution to the violence that swept the streets was an appointed
bench filled by judges with expertise and independent from mob corruption.
Earl Warren was active in the creation of Western committees tasked to flesh
out the details of the new system. The “Curb Crime” campaign in California
proposed a judicial selection plan which was consistent with the Judicature
Society’s model. It included a nominating board for judicial candidates from
which the governor would make his appointments. To keep their seats, judges
would periodically stand for popular retention elections.
Soon, as Shugerman describes in detail, the proposal morphed in some
jurisdictions into an appointment process whereby the governor nominated
a person who required approval from an evaluation committee. This new
“merit” system met the progressive worldview that government needed more
qualified, efficient managers. The only thing left was to create a campaign that
would use an initiative process by which the people themselves would demand
that they have less say in the judicial selection process. The plan worked and
California led the way for revival of judicial appointments in America. The
voters embraced merit plans because they were promoted as based on “fairness,
equal justice and judicial independence” (239).
Lessons of Today’s Elections:
Money, Greed and Judicial Elections
For many of us, the touchstone event associated with the battle over judicial
independence was the retention election of 1986, in which the Californians
voted out three state Supreme Court justices, including Chief Justice Rose
Bird. Many factors led to that result and Shugerman carefully describes
each: the tort revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, law enforcement and their
opponents’ battle over the death penalty, and general concerns that the judges
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were dismissive of the state’s key business interests. Political coalitions poured
money into defeating the marked “liberal” justices and a new era was born.
In the late eighteenth century, appointments during good behavior were
designed to separate judges from the political branches. In the mid-nineteenth
century, corruption and capture led states to adopt direct elections in order to
separate the courts from the political branches even more decisively. In the
twentieth century, the partisanship and corruption of direct elections led to a
hybrid of appointment and election” (258).

Yet, we are now in a time when political and financial forces can not only
unseat judges, but also actually seat political favorites to the bench. Today, a
nearly-unrestricted flow of money threatens to corrupt even a merit system that
includes retention elections. The U. S. Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
United has opened the Pandora’s box. Without limits on electoral spending,
corporations have the opportunity to reshape judicial elections.
How will judicial independence be preserved in this era? Retention
elections make judges less vulnerable, but they do not immunize judges
completely. In the last segment of his book, Shugerman searches for answers
to today’s challenges to judicial independence.
Moving Forward: Democracy and Due Process
Again we are faced with the challenge of creating a judicial selection system
that allows judges to be independent enough to reach just verdicts and yet
accountable to those who will be affected by those verdicts. While the majority
of The People’s Courts illuminates the historical context of judicial elections and
appointments, toward the very end of the book, Shugerman offers his own
suggestions for maintaining relative judicial independence in current times.
He is a strong advocate for retention elections, and he seeks modifications to
make them as fair as possible and to avoid the domination of the courts by
those with money and political power.
Of his many suggestions, two stand out. First, he puts faith in the Due
Process Clause and the power to recuse judges as a way of countering efforts
to buy rulings in cases. I wish I shared his confidence. While the Supreme
Court did hold in Caperton v. Massey4 that judges must recuse themselves from
the cases of major political donors, the Court did not offer a clear standard
for applying due process standards and there continues to be concern
over whether corporate interests will dominate judicial elections.5 Second,
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Shugerman embraces the political system as a countervailing force to keep
judges in check. He writes, “[i]nstead of voting judges out of office, voters
might focus instead on the substance of their rulings through constitutional
amendment and legislative override, just as many progressives had suggested
in the 1910s” (264). In abstract terms, he is probably right. Separation of
powers is designed to protect judges yet keep them accountable. However, the
logistical difficulties of accomplishing those overrides may make them little
more than theoretical possibilities.
Conclusion
Thanks to Professor Shugerman’s fine work, professors now have a firm
foundation upon which to teach the history of judicial independence in
America. “[T]he value of judicial independence has been a surprisingly robust,
resilient, and popular value from the colonial era to the present” (268).
The primary value of this book is to get everyone to think harder and
deeper and to understand that judicial independence, as with other concepts
in the law, is not an absolute. It must be contextualized to historical times and
considered as an aspect of broader important concepts in the law, including
separation of powers, judicial accountability, and the importance of the rule of
law. In the end, Shugerman’s title teaches it all. The judges are “The Peoples’
Courts.” The challenge is in figuring out who these “People” are, how they
will be represented, and how much accountability there should be to them by
judges ruling on their cases.

